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Abstract—The difficulty of large scale monitoring of app
markets affects our understanding of their dynamics. This is
particularly true for dimensions such as app update frequency,
control and pricing, the impact of developer actions on app
popularity, as well as coveted membership in top app lists. In this
paper we perform a detailed temporal analysis on two datasets
we have collected from the Google Play Store, one consisting
of 160,000 apps and the other of 87,223 newly released apps.
We have monitored and collected data about these apps over
more than 6 months. Our results show that a high number of
these apps have not been updated over the monitoring interval.
Moreover, these apps are controlled by a few developers that
dominate the total number of app downloads. We observe that
infrequently updated apps significantly impact the median app
price. However, a changing app price does not correlate with
the download count. Furthermore, we show that apps that attain
higher ranks have better stability in top app lists. We show that
app market analytics can help detect emerging threat vectors, and
identify search rank fraud and even malware. Further, we discuss
the research implications of app market analytics on improving
developer and user experiences.
I. INTRODUCTION
The revolution in mobile device technology and the emer-
gence of “app markets”, have empowered regular users to
evolve from technology consumers to enablers of novel mobile
experiences. App markets such as Google Play provide new
mechanisms for software distribution, collecting software writ-
ten by developers and making it available to smartphone users.
This centralized approach to software distribution contrasts the
desktop paradigm, where users obtain their software directly
from developers.
Developers and users play key roles in determining the
impact that market interactions have on future technology.
However, the lack of a clear understanding of the inner
workings and dynamics of popular app markets, impacts both
developers and users. For instance, app markets provide no
information on the impact that developer actions will likely
have on the success of their apps, or guidance to users when
choosing apps, e.g., among apps claiming similar functionality.
This situation is exploited however by fraudulent and mali-
cious developers. The success of Google Play and the incentive
model it offers to popular apps 1, make it an appealing target
for fraudulent and malicious behaviors. Fraudulent developers
have been shown to attempt to engineer the search rank of
their apps [34], while malicious developers have been shown
A preliminary version of this paper appears in ASONAM 2015.
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1 Google offers financial incentives for contribution to app development,
by making revenue sharing transparent for developers (70-to-30 cut, where
developers get 70% of the revenue).
to use app markets as a launch pad for their malware [26],
[28], [33], [20].
Contributions. In this article we seek to shed light on the
dynamics of Google Play, the most popular Android app
market. We report results from one of the first characteristic
studies on Google Play, using real-world time series data. To
this end, we have developed iMarket, a prototype app market
crawling system. We have used iMarket to collect data from
more than 470,000 Google Play apps, and daily monitor more
than 160,000 apps, over more than 6 months.
We use this data to study two key aspects of Google Play.
First, we seek to understand the dynamics of the market in
general, from an application and developer perspective. For
this, we evaluate the frequency and characteristics of app
updates (e.g., their effects on bandwidth consumption), and
use the results to determine if developers price their apps
appropriately. We show that only 24% of the 160,000 app
that we monitored have received an update within 6 months,
and at most 50% of the apps in any category have received
an update within a year from our observation period. We
conclude that market inactivity has a significant impact on
the price distribution. Therefore, while pricing is an important
and complex task, relying on statistics computed on the entire
population (as opposed to only active apps) may mislead de-
velopers, e.g., to undersell their apps (§VI-A). Also, we show
that typical app update cycles are bi-weekly or monthly. More
frequently updated apps (under beta-testing or unstable) can
impose substantial bandwidth overhead and expose themselves
to negative reviews (§VI-C).
To evaluate the developer impact, we first seek to verify our
hypothesis that a few developers control the app market supply.
Our analysis reveals however that developers that create many
applications are not creating many popular applications. In-
stead, we discovered that a few elite developers are responsible
for applications that dominate the total number of downloads
(§VII). Second, we evaluate the impact of developer actions on
the popularity of their apps. We show that few apps frequently
change prices, and with every subsequent software update,
a developer is more likely to decrease the price. However,
changing the price does not show an observable association
with the app’s download count(§VII).
A second key aspect of Google Play that we study is the
temporal evolution of top-k ranked lists maintained by the
market. Top-k lists reveal the most popular applications in
various categories. We show that a majority of apps in top-k
app lists follow a “birth-growth-decline-death” process: they
enter and exit from the bottom part of a list. Apps that attain
higher ranks have better stability in top-k lists than apps that
are at lower ranks (§VIII).
2Impact of the study. A longitudinal study of Google Play app
metadata can provide unique information that is not available
through the standard approach of capturing a single app
snapshot. Features extracted from a longitudinal app analysis
(e.g., permission, price, update, download count changes) can
provide insights into fraudulent app promotion and malware
indicator behaviors. For instance, spikes in the number of
positive or negative reviews and the number of downloads
received by an app can indicate app search optimization cam-
paigns launched by fraudsters recruited through crowdsourcing
sites. Frequent, substantial app updates may indicate Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks, while permission changes can indicate
benign apps turning malicious see § IX-A. Features extracted
from a longitudinal app monitoring can be used to train
supervised learning algorithms to detect such behaviors.
In addition, a detailed longitudinal study of Google Play
apps can improve developer and user experiences. For in-
stance, app development tools can help developers optimize
the success of their apps. Such tools can integrate predictions
of the impact that price, permissions and code changes will
have on the app’s popularity, as well as insights extracted from
user reviews. In addition, visualizations of conclusions, and
analytics similar to the ones we perform in this paper, can help
users choose among apps with similar claimed functionality.
We include a detailed discussion of the applicability and
future research directions in app market analytics in §IX.
II. RELATED WORK
This article extends our preliminary work [10] with iMarket,
the market crawler we developed and used to collect the data,
new scores to evaluate the evolution and variability of top-k
lists and new experiments and evaluations.
Viennot et al. [35] developed PlayDrone, a crawler to
collect Google Play data. Their main finding is that Google
Play developers often include secret key information in the
released apps, making them vulnerable to attacks. They further
analyze the data and show that Google Play content evolves
quickly in time, that 25% of apps are clones, and that native
experience correlates strongly to popularity. The analysis is
performed over data collected for 3 non-contiguous months
(May/June 2013 and November 2013). In contrast, our analysis
is performed over apps monitored daily over more than 6
months. Furthermore, our analysis includes orthogonal app
market dynamics dimensions, that include the frequency and
cycles of app updates, the developer impact and control on the
app market, and the dynamics of top-k lists.
Zhong and Michahelles [40] analyze a dataset of Google
Play transactions, and suggest that Google Play is more of
a “Superstar” market (i.e., dominated by popular hit prod-
ucts) than a “Long-tail” market (i.e., where unpopular niche
products contribute to a substantial portion of popularity).
In addition, Zhong and Michahelles [40] show that certain
expensive professional apps attract disproportionately large
sales. This is consistent with our finding that a few developers
are responsible for the most popular apps.
Mo¨ller et al. [29] use an app they posted on Google Play
to study the correlation between published updates and their
actual installations. They show that 7 days after a security
update is published, almost half of the app’s users still use
an older, vulnerable version. Liu et al. [25] use a dataset of
1,597 ranked mobile apps to conclude that the “freemium”
strategy is positively associated with increased sales volume
and revenue of the paid apps. Moreover, they show that free
apps that rate higher contribute to higher revenue for the
paid version. We note that our work studies a multitude of
previously unanswered questions about Google Play, regarding
app update frequency and pricing appropriateness, and the
evolution of top-k lists.
Petsas et al. [30] explored mobile app markets in the context
of 4 providers, that do not include Google Play. They show
that the distribution of app popularity deviates from Zipf, due
in part to a strong temporal affinity of user downloads to app
categories. They show that on the markets they studied, paid
apps follow a different popularity distribution than free apps.
In contrast, our work exclusively analyzes Google Play, the
most popular Android app market. In addition, we focus on
different dimensions: (i) app update frequency and its effect on
app pricing and resource consumption, (ii) the control of the
market and the effect of developer actions on the popularity
of their apps and (iii) the evolution in time of top apps and
top-k app lists.
Xu et al. [39] use IP-level traces from a tier-1 cellular
network provider to understand the behavior of mobile apps.
They provide an orthogonal analysis of spatial and temporal
locality, geographic coverage, and daily usage patterns.
Security has been a theme in the large scale collection of
mobile apps. Previous work includes malware detection [42],
malware analysis [41], malicious ad libraries [19], vulner-
ability assessment [15], overprivilege identication [16] and
detection of privacy leaks [14]. While in this paper we focus
on the different problem of understanding the dynamics of
Google Play, we also introduce novel mobile app attacks.
III. GOOGLE PLAY OVERVIEW
App Distribution Channel: Google Play is the app distri-
bution channel hosted by Google. Each app submitted by
a developer gets an entry on the market in the form of a
webpage, accessible to users through either the Google Play
homepage or the search interface. This webpage contains
meta-information that keeps track of information pertaining
to the application (e.g., name, category, version, size, prices).
In addition, Google Play lists apps according to several cate-
gories, ranging from “Arcarde & Action” to “Weather”. Users
download and install apps of interest, which they can then
review. A review has a rating ranging from 1 to 5. Each
app has an aggregate rating, an average over all the user
ratings received. The app’s webpage also includes its usage
statistics (e.g., rating, number of installs, user reviews). This
information is used by users when they are deciding to install
a new application.
App Development: In order to submit apps to Google Play, an
Android developer first needs to obtain a publisher account for
a one-time fee of $25. The fee encourages higher quality prod-
ucts and reduces spam [18]. Google does not limit the number
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Fig. 1. Architecture of iMarket, the developed GooglePlay crawler. It consists
of a distributed crawler, processing engine and data management components.
of apps that can be submitted by developers. As a measure to
reduce spam, Google recently started the Bouncer [3] service,
which provides automated scanning of applications on Google
Play for potential malware. Developers can sell their apps for
a price of their choice, or distribute them for free.
Permission Model: Android follows the Capability-based [24]
security model. Each app must declare the list of capabilities
(permissions) it requires in a manifest file called Android-
Manifest.xml. When a user downloads an app through the
Google Play website, the user is shown a screen that displays
the permissions requested by the application. Installing the
application means granting the application all the requested
permissions i.e. an all-or-none approach.
IV. DATA COLLECTION
We use snapshot to refer to the entire state of the market
i.e., it contains meta information of all apps. We first describe
iMarket, our app market crawler, then describe the datasets
that we collected from Google Play.
A. The iMarket Crawler
iMarket, our prototype market crawling system (see Figure 1
for an overview) consists of three main components. First,
the Distributed Crawler component, which is responsible
for crawling the target market and collecting information on
various apps that are accessible from the current geographical
location. We initially leveraged hundreds of foreign proxies to
address challenge 3 above. However, we later decided to rely
only on local US-based proxies for stability reasons. While
this trades-off completeness for consistency, having continu-
ous information about a few apps improves the accuracy of
most statistical inference tasks compared to having discrete
information about hundreds of thousands of apps.
To seed our distributed crawler, we initially ran it using a
list consisting of about 200 randomly hand-picked apps from
different categories. To address Challenge 1, our app discovery
process is designed as follows: After retrieving each page, the
“Similar Apps” portion of the raw HTML page is parsed to
obtain a new list of packages. These packages are queued for
crawling and simultaneously appended to the previous day’s
package list. We have also detected a ban detection engine
in place that deactivates servers once it observes a threshold
number of “404 Not Found” messages (Challenge 2) from the
market provider.
The second component, the “Processing Engine” contains
a Map-Reduce Parser component that uses the map-reduce
paradigm [13] to handle parsing of hundreds of thousands of
raw HTML app pages. In the “map” stage, a chunk of files
(≈10K) are mapped onto each of the 700 machines and a
parser (written in Python) parses these HTML and extracts
the meta information. In the “reduce” stage, these individual
files are combined into a single file and de-duplicated to
maintain data integrity. This stage takes ≈1-1.5 hours. After
constructing the aggregate file, we address Challenge 3 using
the assertion checker that takes a best-effort approach to ensure
that all the information has been correctly parsed from the raw
files. Note that despite our best-effort approach, our dataset
still contained some missing information due to temporary
unavailability/maintenance of servers.
The third, “Data Management” component, archives the raw
HTML pages (≈14 GB compressed/day) in a cloud storage to
support any ad hoc processing for other tasks (e.g., analyzing
HTML source code complexity) and subsequently removed
from the main servers. To address Challenge 4, the formatted
daily snapshot (≈200 MB/day) is then inserted into a database
to support data analytics. We setup the relevant SQL Jobs
to ensure that indexes are re-built every two days — this
step significantly speeds up SQL queries. Our six months of
archived raw files consume ≈7 TB of storage and the database
consumes ≈400 GB including index files.
V. DATA
We used iMarket to collect two Google Play datasets, which
we call dataset.2012 and dataset.14-15.
A. Dataset.2012
We have used a total of 700 machines 2 for a period of
7.5 months (February 2012 - November 2012) to collect data
from 470,000 apps. The first 1.5 months are the “warm up”
interval. We do not consider data collected during this period
for subsequent analysis. Instead, we focus on a subset of 160K
apps for which we have collected the following data:
GOOGPLAY-FULL: We used iMarket to take daily snapshots
of Google Play store from April - November, 2012. For each
app, we have daily snapshots of application meta-information
consisting of the developer name, category, downloads (as
a range i.e., 10-100, 1K-5K etc.), ratings (on a 0-5 scale),
ratings count (absolute number of user ratings), last updated
timestamp, software version, OS supported, file size, price, url
and the set of permissions that the app requests. Figure 2(a)
shows the distribution of apps by category. While overall, the
2We have used 700 machines, each with a different IP address and from a
different subnet, in order to avoid getting banned during the crawling process.
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Fig. 2. Distribution of free vs. paid apps, by category, for (a) dataset.2012 and dataset.14-15. The number of free apps exceeds the number of paid ones
especially in dataset.14-15. We conjecture that this occurs due to user tendency to install more free apps than paid apps. Since 2012, developers may have
switched from a direct payment model for paid apps, to an ad based revenue model for free apps.
Arcade & Action
Books & Reference
Brain & Puzzle
Business
Cards & Casino
Casual
Comics
Communication
Education
Entertainment
Finance
Health & Fitness
Libraries & Demo
Lifestyle
Media & Video
Medical
Music & Audio
News & Magazines
Personalization
Photography
Productivity
Racing
Shopping
Social
Sports
Sports Games
Tools
Transportation
Travel & Local
Weather
0
11/24/2012
365
1 yr
730
2 yrs
1095
3 yrs
1465
4 yrs
Age Since Last Update (in days)
Ca
te
go
ry
(a)
Arcade & Action
Books & Reference
Business
Cards & Casino
Casual
Comics
Communication
Education
Entertainment
Family
Finance
Health & Fitness
Libraries & Demo
Lifestyle
Media & Video
Medical
Music & Audio
News & Magazines
Personalization
Photography
Productivity
Brain & Puzzle
Racing
Shopping
Social
Sports
Tools
Transportation
Travel & Local
Weather
0 100 200 300 400
Age Since Last Update (in days)
Ca
te
go
ry
(b)
Fig. 3. Box and whiskers plot of the time distribution from the last update, by app category, for (a) dataset.2012: at most 50% of the apps in each category
have received an update within a year and (b) dataset.14-15: at most 50% of the apps in each category have received an update within 35 days. This may
occur since new apps are likely to have more bugs and receive more attention from developers.
number of free apps exceed the number of paid apps, several
popular categories such as “Personalization” and “Books &
References” are dominated by paid apps.
GOOGPLAY-TOPK: Google publishes several lists, e.g., Free
(most popular apps), Paid (most popular paid), New (Free)
(newly released free apps), New (Paid) (newly released paid)
and Gross (highly grossing apps). Each list is divided into
≈20 pages, each page consisting of 24 apps. These lists are
typically updated based on application arrival and the schedule
of Google’s ranking algorithms. Since we cannot be notified
when the list changes, we took hourly snapshots of the lists.
Our GOOGPLAY-TOPK consists of hourly snapshots of five
top-k lists (≈ 3000 apps) from Jul-Nov, 2012 (≈2880 hours
worth of data).
B. Dataset.14-15
Further, we have used a dataset of more than 87,000 newly
released apps that we have monitored over more than 6
months [32]. Specifically, we have collected newly released
apps once a week, from Google Play’s “New Release” links,
to both free and paid apps. We have validated each app based
on the date of the app’s first review: we have discarded apps
whose first review was more than 40 days ago. We have
collected 87,223 new releases between July and October 2014,
all having less than 100 reviews.
We have then monitored and collected data from these
87,223 apps between October 24, 2014 and May 5, 2015.
Specifically, for each app we captured “snapshots” of its
Google Play metadata, twice a week. An app snapshot consists
of values for all its time varying variables, e.g., the reviews, the
rating and install counts, and the set of requested permissions.
For each of the 2, 850, 705 reviews we have collected from the
87, 223 apps, we recorded the reviewer’s name and id, date of
review, review title, text, and rating.
Figure 2(b) shows the distribution of apps by category. With
the exception of the “Personalization” category, the number of
free apps significantly exceeds the number of paid apps. We
have observed that consistently through our collection effort,
we identified fewer top paid than free new releases. One reason
for this may be that users tend to install more free apps than
paid apps. Thus, not only developers may develop fewer paid
apps, but paid apps may find it hard to compete against free
5versions. We note that free apps bring revenue through ads.
VI. POPULARITY AND STALENESS
We first evaluate the fraction of apps that are active, and
discuss the implications this can have on app pricing. We
then classify apps based on their popularity, and study the
distribution of per-app rating counts. Finally, we study the
frequency of app updates for apps from various classes and the
implications they can have on end-users. All the analysis pre-
sented in this section is performed using GOOGPLAY-FULL.
A. Market Staleness
An important property of a market is its “activity”, or how
frequently are apps being maintained. We say that an app is
stale if it has not been updated within the last year from the
observation period, and active otherwise.
The task of setting the app price is complex. However, rely-
ing on statistics computed on the entire population, as opposed
to only active apps, may mislead developers. For instance,
given that the listing price of apps forms a key component
of its valuation and sale, this becomes an important factor
for fresh developers trying to enter the market. Specifically,
the median price in our dataset is $0.99 when all apps are
considered and $1.31 when considering only active apps. This
confirm our intuition that developers that set their price based
on the former value are likely to sell their apps at lower profits.
Figure 3(a) shows the box and whiskers plot [8] of the
per-app time since the last update, by app category, for
dataset.2012. At most 50% of the apps in each category have
received an update within a year from our observation period.
For instance, most apps in Libraries & Demo have not been
updated within the last 1.5 years. Some categories such as
Arcade & Action, Casual, Entertainment, Books & Reference,
Tools contain apps that are older than three years.
Figure 3(b) plots this data for dataset.14-15. Many freshly
uploaded apps were uploaded more recently: 50% apps in each
category receive an update within 35 days, while apps in the
“Social” and “Tools” categories received updates even within
15 days. This is natural, as new apps may have more bugs and
receive more developer attention.
Several reasons may explain the lack of updates received by
many of the apps we monitored. First, some apps are either
stable or classic (time-insensitive apps, not expected to change)
and do not require an update. Other apps, e.g., e-books,
wallpapers, libraries, do not require an update. Finally, many
of the apps we monitored seemed to have been abandoned.
B. App Popularity
We propose to use the download count to determine app
popularity. Higher rating counts mean higher popularity but
not necessarily higher quality (e.g., an app could attract many
negative ratings). Including unpopular apps will likely affect
statistics such as update frequencies: including unpopular apps
will lead to a seemingly counter-intuitive finding, indicating
that most apps do not receive any updates. Therefore, we
classify apps according to their popularity into three classes,
“unpopular”, “popular” and “most-popular”.
Class # download % Dataset.2012 % Dataset.14-15
Unpopular 0 – 103 74.14 77.55
Popular 103 – 105 24.1 18.43
Most-Popular > 105 0.7 4.00
TABLE I
Popularity classes of apps, along with their distribution. Dataset.14-15 has a
higher percentage of most-popular apps.
Table I shows the criteria for the 3 classes and the distri-
bution of the apps in dataset.2012 and dataset.14-15 in these
classes. The newly released apps have a higher percentage of
unpopular apps, however, surprisingly, they also have a higher
percentage of “most-popular” apps. This may be due to the
fact that the newly released apps are more recent, coming at a
time of higher popularity of mobile app markets, and maturity
of search rank fraud markets (see § IX-A).
Figure 4 (top) depicts the distribution of rating counts of
apps from dataset.2012, split by categories. We observe that
the Business and Comics categories do not have any apps in the
Most-Popular class, likely because of narrow audiences. From
our data, we observed that the median price of apps ($1.99)
in these categories is significantly higher than the population
($1.31) indicating lower competition. The population in other
categories is quite diverse with a number of outliers. For
instance, as expected, “Angry Birds” and “Facebook” are most
popular among the Most-Popular class for Arcade & Action
and Social categories, respectively. On the other hand, the
distribution is almost symmetric in case of Unpopular except
Business and Medical categories where there are a number
of outliers that are significantly different from the rest of the
population. We found that these are trending apps — apps that
are gaining popularity. For instance, the free app “Lync 2010”
from “Microsoft Corporation” in Business has 997 ratings. In
case of Popular, the distributions for most of the categories
are symmetric and span roughly from 1, 000 to 100K ratings
where 75% of apps have less than 10, 000 rating counts except
Arcade & Action category.
Figure 4 (bottom) shows the same distribution for the apps
in dataset.14-15. We emphasize that the distribution is plotted
over the ratings counts at the end of the observation interval.
Since these are newer apps than those in dataset.2012, it is
natural that they receive fewer ratings. We also observe that
several categories do not have apps that are in the “most
popular” category, including the “Business”, “Libraries &
Demo” and “Medical” categories.
C. App Updates
Updates form a critical and often the last part of the software
lifecycle [17]. We are interested in determining if mobile
app developers prefer seamless updating i.e., if they push out
releases within short time periods.
Fig. 5(a) shows the distribution of the number of updates
received by the apps in dataset.2012. Only 24% apps have
received at least one update within our observation period —
nearly 76% have never been updated. In contrast, Fig. 5(b)
shows that 35% of the “fresh” apps in dataset.14-15 have
received at least one update within our observation period.
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Fig. 5. (a) Histogram of app updates for dataset.2012. Only 24% apps have received at least one update between April-November 2012. (b) Histogram of
fresh app updates for dataset.14-15. Unlike the dataset.2012, 35% of the fresh apps have received at least one update, while 1 app received 146 updates! (c)
Histogram of app category changes. 1.9% apps have received at least one category change between October 24, 2014 and May 5, 2015, while several have
received 6 category changes.
Several apps received more than 100 updates, with one app
receiving 146 updates in a 6 months interval. We conjecture
that this occurs because these are newly released apps, thus
more likely to have bugs, and to receive attention from their
developers.
Figure 6 (top) plots the distribution of the update frequency
of the apps from dataset.2012, across categories based on their
popularity. As expected, Unpopular apps receive few or no
updates. We observed that this is due to the app being new
or abandoned by its developer. For instance, “RoboShock”
from “DevWilliams” in Arcade & Action with good reviews
from 4 users has received only one update on September 28,
2012 since its release in August 2011 (inferred from its first
comment). Another app “Shanju” from “sunjian” in Social has
not been updated since May 27, 2012 even though it received
negative reviews.
Outliers (e.g., “Ctalk” in the Social category) push out
large number of updates (111). Popular apps are updated
more frequently: 75% in each category receive 10 or fewer
updates, while some apps average around 10-60 updates during
our observation period. User comments associated with these
apps indicate that the developer pushes out an update when
the app attracts a negative review (e.g., “not working on my
device!”). In the Most-Popular category, the population differs
significantly. While some apps seldom push any updates, apps
like “Facebook” (Social) have been updated 17 times. The
lower number of updates of most popular apps may be due
to testing: Companies that create very popular apps are more
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Fig. 6. The distribution of update frequency, i.e., the update count for each app per category. (Top) Dataset.2012. Unpopular apps receive few or no
updates. Popular apps however received more updates than most-popular apps. This may be due to most-popular apps being more stable, created by developers
with well established development and testing processes. (Bottom) Dataset.14-15. We observe a similar update count distribution among unpopular apps to
dataset.2012. Further, in the popular and most popular classes, most app categories tend to receive fewer updates than the dataset.2012 apps. However, a few
apps receive significantly more updates, with several popular apps receiving over 100 updates.
likely to enforce strict testing and hence may not need as many
updates as other apps.
To identify how frequently developers push these updates,
we computed the average update interval (AUI) per app mea-
sured in days (figure not shown). In Popular and Unpopular
classes, 50% of apps receive at least one update within 100
days. The most interesting set is a class of Unpopular apps
that receive an update in less than a week. For instance, the
developer of “Ctalk” pushed, on average, one update per day
totaling 111 updates in six months indicating development
stage (it had only 50-100 downloads) or instability of the app.
On the other hand,Most-Popular apps receive an update within
20 to 60 days.
Figure 6 (bottom) shows the update frequency for the
newly released apps of dataset.14-15. Compared to the apps in
dataset.2012, new releases exhibit a similar update frequency
distribution, with slightly lower third quartiles. However, a
few newly released popular apps receive significantly more
updates, some more than 100 updates.
Updates, bandwidth and reputation. A high update fre-
quency is a likely indicator of an on-going beta test of a feature
or an unstable application. Such apps have the potential to
consume large amounts of bandwidth. For instance, a music
player “Player Dreams”, with 500K-1M downloads, pushed
out 91 updates in the last six months as part of its beta testing
phase (inferred from app description). With the application
size being around 1.8 MB, this app has pushed out ≈164
MB to each of its users. Given its download count of 500K-
1M, each update utilizes ≈0.87-1.71 TB of bandwidth. We
have observed that frequent updates, especially when the app
is unstable, may attract negative reviews. For instance, “Ter-
remoti Italia” that pushed out 34 updates in the observation
interval, often received negative reviews of updates disrupting
the workflow.
Furthermore, app market providers can use these indicators
to inform users about seemingly unstable applications and also
as part of the decision to garbage collect abandoned apps.
D. App Category Changes
In the fresh app dataset.14-15 we found app category change
events, e.g., “Social” to “Communication”, “Photography” to
“Entertainment”, between different game subcategories. Such
category changes may enable developers to better position
their apps and improve on their install and download count,
as categories may overlap, and apps may stretch over multiple
categories. Fig. 5(c) shows the distribution of the number
of app category changes recorded over the 6 months in
dataset.14-15. Only 1.9% of apps have received at least one
category change.
VII. DEVELOPER IMPACT
In this section, we are interested in understanding what
fraction of popular apps are being controlled by an elite set of
8developers and if there is a power-law effect in-place. Next,
we analyze the impact that developer actions (e.g., changing
the price, permissions etc.) can have on the app popularity.
We use dataset.2012 for this analysis.
A. Market Control
To understand the impact that developers have on the mar-
ket, we observe their number of apps, downloads, and review
count. Figure 7 plots these distributions, all showing behavior
consistent with a power-law distribution [27]. We display the
maximum likelihood fit of a power-law distribution for each
scatter plot as well [22], [11]. Figure 7(a) shows that a few
developers have a large number of apps while many developers
have few apps. However, the developers that post the most
apps do not have the most popular apps in terms of reviews
and download counts. Instead, Figure 7(b) shows that a few
developers control apps that attract most of the reviews. Since
Figure 7(c) shows an almost linear relation between review
and download counts (1 review for each 300 downloads), we
conclude that the apps developed by the controlling developers
are popular.
B. Price Dispersion
Menu costs (incurred by sellers when making price changes)
are lower in electronic markets as physical markets incur
product re-labeling costs [23]. In app markets menu costs are
zero. We now investigate if developers leverage this advantage
i.e., if they adjust their prices more finely or frequently.
Figure 8 shows a variation of the complementary cumulative
distribution frequency (CCDF) of the number of price changes
an app developer made during our observation period. Instead
of probabilities, the y axis shows the square root of the number
of apps with a number of price changes exceeding the value
shown on the x axis. We observe that 5.14% of the apps
(≈4000) have changed their price at least once. The tail (>
70 changes) is interesting — about 23 apps are frequently
changing their prices. From our data, we observed that they
are distributed as follows: Travel & Local (11), Sports (5),
Business (2), Brain & Puzzle (2) and one in each of Education,
Finance, and Medical. In this sample, “LogMeIn Ignition”,
developed by LogMeIn, has 10K-50K downloads and under-
went 83 price changes (Min:$18.44, Max:$27.80, Avg:$26.01,
Stdev:$2.01). The rest were either recently removed or are
unpopular.
Price dispersion is the spread between the highest and
lowest prices in the market. In our dataset, we used the
coefficient of variation (COV) [38], the ratio of standard
deviation to the mean, to measure price dispersion. COV= 1
indicates a dispersal consistent with a Poisson process i.e.,
uniformly at random; COV> 1 indicates greater variability
than would be expected with a Poisson process; and COV< 1
indicates less variation. In our dataset, we observed an average
COV (computed for all apps) to be 2.45 indicating a non-
negligible price dispersion, in agreement with results in the
context of other electronic markets [9].
Figure 9 shows the STL decomposition [12] of the average
price time series in the observation interval, for a periodicity of
D ↑ P ↓ P ↑ RC ↑ SV ↑ TP ↓ TP ↑
D ↑ 0.18 -0.02 0.13 0.34 0.09 0.21
P ↓ 0.18 -1.00 0.09 0.89 0.89 0.93
P ↑ -0.02 -1.00 -0.23 0.72 0.51 0.76
RC ↑ 0.13 0.09 -0.23 0.73 0.65 0.70
SV ↑ 0.34 0.89 0.72 0.73 0.99 1.00
TP ↓ 0.09 0.89 0.51 0.65 0.99 -1.00
TP ↑ 0.21 0.94 0.76 0.70 1.00 -1.00
TABLE II
Yule association measure for pairs of attributes for dataset.2012. The sample
size is the entire dataset for the observation interval. D is number of
downloads, P is price, RC is review count, SV is software version number
and TP is the total number of permissions. (↑) denotes an increasing
attribute and (↓) denotes a decreasing one.
one month. The gray-bar on the “monthly panel” (see Figure 9)
is only slightly larger than that on the “data” panel indicating
that the monthly signal is large relative to the variation in the
data. In the “trend” panel, the gray box is much larger than
either of the ones on the “data”/“monthly” panels, indicating
the variation attributed to the trend is much smaller than the
monthly component and consequently only a small part of
the variation in the data series. The variation attributed to the
trend is considerably smaller than the stochastic component
(the remainders). We deduce that in our six month observation
period this data does not exhibit a trend.
C. Impact of Developer Actions
Developers have control over several attributes they can
leverage to increase the popularity of their apps, e.g., pricing,
the number of permissions requested from users and the
frequency of updates. In this section we investigate the relation
between such levers and their impact on app popularity. For
instance, common-sense dictates that a price reduction should
increase the number of downloads an app receives.
We study the association between app attribute changes.
We define a random variable for increase or decrease of each
attribute, and measure the association among pairs of variables.
For example, let X be a variable for price increase. For each
〈 day, app 〉 tuple, we let X be a set of all of the app and day
tuples where the app increased its price that day (relative to
the previous day’s value). For this analysis we consider 160K
apps that have changed throughout our observation period,
and we discard the remaining apps. We use the Yule measure
of association[37] to quantify the association between two
attributes, A and B:
|A∩B|∗|A∩B|−|A∩B|∗|A∩B|
|A∩B|∗|A∩B|+|A∩B|∗|A∩B|
.
A is the complement of A, i.e., each 〈 day, app 〉 tuple where
the attribute does not occur, and |A| denote the cardinality
of a set (in this case A). This association measure captures
the association between the two attributes: zero indicates
independence, +1 indicates perfectly positive association, and
-1 perfectly negative association. Table II shows the measure
values for all pairs of download count (D), price (P), review
count (RC) and total number of permission (TP) attributes.
Table II shows that a price decrease has a high association
with changes in software version and permissions. However,
similarly high associations are not observed with a price
increase. Thus, when a developer is updating software or
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Fig. 9. Monthly trend for the average app price. Over the 6 month observation
interval, the average app price does not exhibit a monthly trend.
permissions they are more likely to decrease the price than
increase the price of an app.
We observed that changing the price does not show sig-
nificant association with the download or review counts. We
randomly sampled 50 apps where this is happening and
observe the following to be the main reasons. First, apps are
initially promoted as free and a paid version is released if
they ever become popular. However, in some cases, the feature
additions are not significant (e.g., ads vs. no ads) and hence
do not cause enough motivation for users to switch to the
paid version. Second, with app markets offering paid apps for
free as part of special offers (e.g., Thanksgiving deals), users
may expect the app to be given out for free rather than take
a discount of a few cents.
VIII. TOP-K DYNAMICS
A higher position in Google’s top-k lists (see §V) is desir-
able and often attracts significant media attention [1] which
Metric Description
DEBUT Debut rank (rank when it first gets onto the list)
HRS2PEAK Hours elapsed from debut until peak rank
PEAK Highest rank attained during its lifetime on the list
TOTHRS Total number of hours spent on the list
EXIT Exit rank (rank during the last hour on the list)
RANKDYN Total ranks occupied during its lifetime on the list
TABLE III
Scores proposed to study the evolution of apps on Top-K lists.
in turn increases the app popularity. To analyze the dynamics
of app in top-k lists, we have used the GOOGPLAY-TOPK
dataset (see §V). Google keeps the ranking algorithms for the
top-k lists secret. In this section we seek answers to several
fundamental questions: How long will an app remain on a top-
k list? Will an app’s rank increase any further than its current
rank? How long will it take for an app’s rank to stabilize?
A. Top-K App Evolution
We investigate first whether apps follow the “birth-growth-
decline-death” process (inverted bathtub curve [21]). Although
every app’s path may be unique, we can summarize its life on
a top-k list using the metrics defined in Table III.
This six-tuple captures a suite of interesting information
contained in each app’s list trajectory. To make these sum-
maries comparable, we remove all applications for which we
are unable to compute the DEBUT information. For instance,
the set of applications obtained during the first hour of the
crawl process are removed.
Figures 10(a) and 10(b) show the histograms for the DEBUT
and EXIT ranks, both indicating list positions, for the 3000
apps we monitored. Smaller numbers indicate better perfor-
mance. The plots show that most apps entered and exited from
the bottom part of the list (indicated by the high debut and exit
ranks). This is consistent with the lifetime metaphor discussed
earlier. However, a small number of apps entered the list highly
ranked. For instance, in the Paid category, the best DEBUT
was attained by “ROM Manager”, by “Koushik Datta” that
entered at #1 on August 14, 2012, and exited at rank #20 on
October 6, 2012, occupying seven different ranks during its
lifetime on the list. Another noteworthy DEBUT was attained
by “Draw Something”, by “OMGPOP” that entered at #2 on
October 1, 2012, peaked to #1 on Oct 25, 2012 and exited
at Nov 6, 2012 at #4. During its lifetime, the worst rank it
achieved was #38.
Figure 10(c) shows the distribution of the peak rank
achieved in top-k lists (PEAK) and Figure 11(a) shows the
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Fig. 10. Distributions of (a) DEBUT, (b) EXIT and (c) achieved PEAK rank. The y axis is the number of apps whose ranks correspond to the values on
the x axis. Most apps entered and exited from the bottom of the list. The New (Free) and New (Paid) lists choose apps updated within the last 20 days.
distribution of the number of hours required for apps to reach
the peak (HRS2PEAK).
Figure 11(b) shows the total number of hours spent by apps
in the top-k lists (TOTHRS). Figure 11(c) shows the number
of ranks achieved in a top-k list (RANKDYN): very few New
(Free) and New (Paid) apps achieve more than 100 different
ranks, with most apps achieving 50 or fewer. This differs
significantly in the other top-k lists.
Among the many apps with poor DEBUT and EXIT po-
sitions, most had a short, uneventful life (i.e., low TOTHRS,
poor PEAK, low HRS2PEAK), but several were able to reach
a high peak position and/or remain for a long time. One entry,
“PS Touch”, by “Adobe”, entered at #413 and has been on the
“Gross” list for 2,403 hours (≈ 3 months, although it peaked
only at #206. This app also took a remarkably slow journey
(more than two months) to reach that peak and has occupied
137 distinct ranks. Also note that 67 apps attained their top
rankings in their debut hour (i.e., HRS2PEAK = 1). Many of
these apps stayed on the list for a very short time, but there
are 6 apps that stayed for 100 - 1000 hours, 31 stayed for
more than 1000 hours.
Figure 11(b) shows that New (Free) and New (Paid) apps
do not stay on the list for more than 500 hours (≈ 20 days)
indicating that these lists may be taking into account all those
applications which were last updated in the last 20 days. We
have confirmed this hypothesis also by verifying that indeed
the “last updated” field of these apps is within the last 20
days. From the same figure, for other lists, we also emphasize
the presence of a long tail of apps that have been present
for thousands of hours. We conclude that: (1) a majority of
apps follows a “birth-growth-decline-death” process, as they
enter/exit from the bottom part of a list, (2) most of the apps
with modest DEBUT and EXIT values have a short, eventful
life occupying many ranks quickly, and (3) the New (Free) and
New (Paid) lists choose among apps that were updated within
the last 20 days.
B. Top-K List Variation
We now characterize the changes in the rankings of the top-
k items from the five lists over time.
We use the Inverse Rank Measure to assess the changes over
time in each of the rankings. This measure gives more weight
Pages List-Type #items Omean Omin Mmean Msd Of∩l
Top 24
Gross 57 23.8953 18 0.9893 0.0617 12
Free 44 23.9539 21 0.9970 0.0238 16
Paid 74 23.8840 11 0.9932 0.0537 4
New (Free) 128 23.7974 15 0.9867 0.0742 0
New (Paid) 125 23.8226 13 0.9889 0.0641 0
Last
25
Gross 205 25.3765 1 0.9692 0.1299 0
Free 186 25.6145 10 0.9785 0.1030 4
Paid 150 24.9245 12 0.9780 0.1029 4
New (Free) 449 25.1159 5 0.9571 0.1502 0
New (Paid) 485 24.9245 2 0.9780 0.1687 0
TABLE IV
Variability in top-k Lists. Omean, Omin and Of∩l are the mean and min.
overlap, and that between the first and last lists.
to identical or near identical rankings among the top ranking
items. This measure tries to capture the intuition that identical
or near identical rankings among the top items indicate greater
similarity between the rankings. Let us assume the following:
kn is the list of top-k apps at time tn, σn(i) is the rank of
app i in kn, Z is the set of items common to kn−1 and kn,
S is the set of items in kn−1 but not in kn, T is the set of
items in kn but not in kn−1. Then, the inverse rank measure
is [7] defined as M (kn−1,kn) = 1 − N
(kn−1,kn)
Nmax(kn−1,kn)
, where
N (kn−1,kn) =
∑
i∈Z |
1
σn−1(i)
− 1
σn(i)
|+
∑
i∈S |
1
σn−1(i)
−
1
(|kn|+1)
|+
∑
i∈T |
1
σn(i)
− 1(|kn−1|+1) |, and Nmax
(kn−1,kn) =
∑|kn−1|
i=1 |
1
i
− 1(|kn|+1) |+
∑|kn|
i=1 |
1
i
− 1(|kn−1|+1) |.
Figure 12(a) shows the variation ofMkt1 ,kt2 for consecutive
days in the month of September. Note that values above 0.7
indicate high similarity [7]. We observe that the lists are
similar from day to day for Free list but this is not the case
for Paid and Gross. Intuitively, this indicates that the effort to
displace a free app seems to be higher than that of a paid app
or the frequency with which the ranking algorithm is run on
Free list is less than that of the Paid list.
This intuition is difficult to verify without access to Google’s
ranking function. To compare the dynamics between the top-24
positions and bottom 25, we computed Mkt1 ,kt2 , the amount
of overlap between two subsequent lists for the two cases (see
Table IV). In addition, we also computed the overlap between
the first and the last lists obtained over the observation period.
The overlap between the first and the last observed lists is zero
in the case of the New(Free) and New(Paid) lists, due to the
higher in-flow of apps in these lists.
In all other cases (except Paid top-24 and last-25 cases),
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Fig. 11. Distributions of (a) required HRS2PEAK, (b) spent TOTHRS and (c) RANKDYN over lifetime. The y axis displays the number of apps whose
hours correspond to the values displayed on the x axis. New (Free) and New (Paid) apps do not stay on the list for more than 500 hours. While few New
(Free) and New (Paid) apps achieve more than 100 different ranks, Gross list apps achieve an almost uniform distribution up to 125 different ranks.
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Fig. 12. (a) The Inverse Rank Measure vs. Timestamp. The Free list varies little from day to day, which is not the case for Paid and Gross. (b) Number of
apps vs. ranks. (c) Lifetime of apps at various ranks. The average top-k list lifetime is longer for higher ranking than for lower ranking apps.
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Fig. 13. Review timeline of “fraud” apps: x axis shows time with a day granularity, y axis the number of daily positive reviews (red, positive direction)
and negative reviews (blue, negative direction). Apps can be targets of both positive and negative search rank fraud campaigns: (a) The app “Daily
Yoga- Yoga Fitness Plans” had days with above 200 positive review spikes. (b) “Real Caller” received suspicious negative review spikes from ground truth
fraudster-controlled accounts. (c) “Crownit - Cashback & Prizes” received both positive and negative reviews from fraudster-controlled accounts.
there is an overlap of at least 50%: apps continue to be popular
for longer periods. In each list-type of last-25 cases, the low
overlap values indicate that the list is highly dynamic and
variable. Also, notice thatMmean for the top-24 is higher than
that of the last-25 indicating that the top-24 is less dynamic
in all cases expect New(Free) and New(Paid).
Figure 12(b) shows the number of apps that occupy a
rank position in 5 different list-types over our observation
period. Note that a lower rank is preferred. For example, the
300th rank position in the New (Free) list is occupied by 441
applications. With the increase in rank, the rate of applications
being swapped is increasing for each category indicating an
increased churn – it is easier for apps to occupy as well as
get displaced on high ranks. For Paid, Gross, and Free, the
number of apps varies from 34 to 142, 30 to 173, and 43 to
163, respectively, from the 1st to the 400th rank.
However, in the case of New (Free) and New(Paid) lists,
the number of apps being swapped for a position is almost
linearly increasing with the increase in rank. This is because
all the applications in these two categories are new and the
competition is higher compared to other list-types.
Figure 12(c) shows the distribution of the lifetime of ap-
plications that occupy a specific rank position. To evaluate
the variation in the distributions we choose the 1st, 50th,
12
100th, 200th, and 400th rank positions. For each category,
the average lifetime is longer for higher ranking apps then for
lower ranking apps. We can clearly observe this phenomenon
in the case of New (Free) and New (Paid). In both the cases,
the lifetime of the apps at the lowest rank (i.e., 400th) is the
lowest, i.e., ≈6 hours and it starts increasing with the increase
in the ranks. We can attribute this effect to the frequently
changing list of new apps and the relatively easier competitions
to be on the top-400 lists. However, in case of Free apps, the
average lifetime of apps on the 1st rank is 94.2 hours and
decreases to 16.7 hours for the 400th rank. For Paid and Gross
categories, the lifetime changes from 81.6 to 20.6 hours and
65.7 to 17.9 hours, respectively, for the rank 1 → 400. We
attribute these effects to the stability of the apps in these lists.
IX. RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
We now discuss the implications of longitudinal monitoring
on security and systems research in Android app markets.
A. Fraud and Malware Detection
App markets play an essential role in the profitability of
apps. Apps ranked higher in the app market become more pop-
ular, thus make more money, either through direct payments
for paid apps, or through ads for free apps. This pressure to
succeed leads some app developers to tinker with app market
statistics known to influence the app ranking, e.g., reviews,
average rating, installs [5]. Further, malicious developers also
attempt to use app markets as tools to widely distribute their
malware apps. We conjecture that a longitudinal analysis of
apps can reveal both fraudulent and malicious apps. In the
following we provide supporting evidence.
Search rank fraud. We have contacted Freelancer workers
specializing in Google Play fraud, and have obtained the ids of
2,600 Google Play accounts that were used to write fraudulent
reviews for 201 unique apps. We have analyzed these apps and
found that fraudulent app search optimization attempts often
produce suspicious review patterns. A longitudinal analysis
of an app’s reviews, which we call timeline, can reveal such
patterns. For instance, Figure 13(a) shows the review timeline
of “Daily Yoga- Yoga Fitness Plans”, one of the 201 apps
targeted by the 15 fraudster-controlled accounts. We observe
several suspicious positive reviews spikes, some at over 200
reviews per day, in contrast with long intervals of under 50
daily positive reviews.
We have observed that Google Play apps can also be
the target of negative review campaigns, receiving nega-
tive reviews from multiple fraudster-controlled accounts. Fig-
ure 13(b) shows the timeline of such an app, “Real Caller”,
where we observe days with up to 25 negative reviews, but few
positive reviews. While negative reviews are often associated
with poor quality apps, these particular spikes are generated
from the fraudster-controlled accounts mentioned above. We
conjecture that negative review campaigns are sponsored by
competitors. Further, we identified apps that are the target of
both positive and negative reviews. Figure 13(c) shows the
timeline of such an app, “Crownit - Cashback & Prizes”. While
the app has received more positive reviews with higher spikes,
its negative reviews and spikes thereof are also significant.
App markets can monitor timelines and notify developers
and their users when such suspicious spikes occur.
In addition, our analysis has shown that several developers
upload many unpopular apps (see §V II), while others tend to
push frequent updates (§VI). We describe here vulnerabilities
related to such behaviors.
Scam Apps. We have identified several “productive” devel-
opers, that upload many similar apps. Among them, we have
observed several thousands of premium applications (priced
around $1.99) that are slight variations of each other and have
almost no observable functionality. Such apps rely on their
names and description to scam users into paying for them, then
fail to deliver. Each such app receives ≈500-1000 downloads,
bringing its developer a profit of $1000-2000.
Malware. While updates enable developers to fix bugs and
push new functionality in a seamless manner, attack vectors
can also leverage them. Such attack vectors can be exploited
both by malicious developers and by attackers that infiltrate
developer accounts. We posit that a motivated attacker can
develop and upload a benign app, and once it gains popularity,
push malware as an update. For instance, Table II shows that
as expected, software version and total permissions are highly
correlated. However, we found that in 5% of cases where
permissions change, the software version does not change.
On the iOS platform, Wang et al. [36] proposed to make
the app remotely exploitable, then introduce malicious control
flows by rearranging already signed code. We propose an
Android variant where the attacker ramps up the permissions
required by the app, exploiting the observation that a user is
more likely to accept them, then to uninstall the app.
To provide an intuition behind our conjecture, we introduce
the concept of app permission timeline, the evolution in time of
an app’s requests for new permissions, or decisions to remove
permissions. We have used VirusTotal [6] to test the apks of
7,756 randomly selected apps from the dataset.14-15. We have
selected apps for which VirusTotal raised at least 3 flags and
that have at least 10 reviews. Figure 14 shows the permission
timeline of 3 of these apps, for both dangerous (red bars) and
regular permissions (blue bars).
For instance, the “Hidden Object Blackstone” app (Fig-
ure 14(a)) has a quick succession of permission requests and
releases at only a few days apart. While the app releases
2 dangerous permissions on November 14, 2014, it requests
them again 1 day later, and requests 2 more a month and a half
later. Similarly, the “Top Race Manager” app (Figure 14(b))
has very frequent permission changes, daily for the last 3.
The “Cash Yourself” app (Figure 14(c)) requests 3 dangerous
permissions on November 10 2014, followed by 1 dangerous
permission in both December and January, then releases 1
dangerous permission 4 days later.
Permission changes imply significant app changes. Frequent
and significant permission changes, especially the dangerous
ones may signal malware, or unstable apps. Market owners can
decide to carefully scan the updates of such apps for malware,
and notify developers that something went wrong with their
updates, indicating potential account infiltration.
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Fig. 14. Permission timeline of 3 VirusTotal flagged apps, (a) “Hidden Object Blackstone”, (b) “Top Race Manager”, and (c) “Cash Yourself”. The x axis
shows the date when the permission changes occurred; the y axis shows the number of permissions that were newly requested (positive direction) or removed
(negative direction). The red bars show dangerous permissions, blue bars regular permissions. We observe significant permission changes, even within days.
B. App Market Ecosystem
Analytics-driven Application Development. We envision a
development model where insights derived from raw market-
level data is integrated into the application development. Such
a model is already adopted by websites such as Priceline [4]
through their “Name Your Own Price” scheme where the
interface provides users with hints on setting an optimal
price towards a successful bid. We propose the extension
of development tools like Google’s Android Studio [2] with
market-level analytics, including:
• Median price: In §VI-A, we showed that developers may
be settling down for lower profits. The development tools
could provide developers them with hints on the optimal
price for their app based on, e.g., the number of features,
the price of active apps in the same category etc.
• Application risk: Provide predictions on the impact of
permissions and updates on reviews and download count.
• App insights: Present actionable insights extracted from
user reviews (e.g., using solutions like NetSieve [31]),
including most requested feature, list of buggy features,
features that crash the app.
Enriching User Experience. We believe data-driven insights
will be indispensable to enhance the end user experience:
• Analytics based app choice: Visualize app price, update
overhead, required permissions, reviewer sentiment to en-
hance the user experience when choosing among apps with
similar claimed functionality. For instance, develop scores
for individual features, and even an overall “sorting” score
based on user preferences. Scam apps (see §IX-A) should
appear at the bottom of the score based sorted app list.
• Analytics based app quarantine: We envision a quarantine
based approach to defend against “update” attacks. An
update installation is postponed until analytics of variation
in app features indicates the update is stable and benign.
To avoid a situation where all users defer installation, we
propose a probabilistic quarantine. Each user can update the
app after a personalized random interval after its release.
X. LIMITATIONS
This paper seeks to shed light on the dynamics of the Google
app market and also provide evidence that a longitudinal
monitoring of apps is beneficial for users, app developers and
the market owners. However, our datasets were collected in
2012 and 2014-2015, and may not reflect the current trends
of Google Play.
In addition, while we believe that the Google Play market,
the applications it hosts and developers we examined represent
a large body of other third-party markets and their environ-
ments, we do not intend to generalize our results to all the
smartphone markets. The characteristics and findings obtained
in this study are associated with the Google Play market and
its developers. Therefore, the results should be taken with the
market and our data collection methodology in mind.
The goal of our discussion of permission and review time-
lines was to provide early evidence that a longitudinal monitor-
ing and analysis of apps in app markets can be used to identify
suspicious apps. We leave for future work a detailed study of
permission changes to confirm their statistical significance in
detecting search rank fraud and malware.
XI. CONCLUSION
This article studies temporal patterns in Google Play, an in-
fluential app market. We use data we collected from more than
160,000 apps daily over a six month period, to examine market
trends, application characteristics and developer behavior in
real-world market settings. Our work provides insights into the
impact of developer levers (e.g., price, permissions requested,
update frequency) on app popularity. We proposed future
directions for integrating analytics insights into developer and
user experiences. We introduced novel attack vectors on app
markets and discussed future detection directions.
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